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This article analyzes the organization ofengineering work in six industrial capitalist countries. 
It identifies four mnjor models for the organimtion of engineering work; the engineering 
profession did not succeed in achieving professional "closure" in any ofthe six countries under 
review. A review ofthe historical evolution ofthe organimtion ofengineering work in each of 
the six countries reveals that engineering has been shaped by a complex interaction among the 
profession itself, employers, the state, labor, and preindustrial forces. However, none of the 
national variations on the four models for organizing engineering labor is stable or without 
internal contradiction because ofthe ambiguous "intermediate" position ofengineers. 
Organizing Engineering Work 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
PETER MEIKSINS 
Cleveland State University 
CHRIS SMITH 
Aston University, England 
I n the past decade or so, a growing amount of attention has been paid to 
the comparative sociology ofengineering. Studies ofengineers in national 
context have revealed the fact that engineers in different countries are 
organized quite differently. The comparative student of engineers is con-
fronted by a bewildering variety of ways oforganizing technical labor. There 
is no agreement, among the major industrial powers, over such basic ques-
tions as, What is an engineer? Where does one draw the line between the 
professional engineer and the nonprofessional technician? How and where 
should engineers be produced? Are unions or/and professional associations 
appropriate institutions for engineers? 
This diversity has spawned a vast "literature of emulation," in which 
analysts of engineering and industry have attempted to persuade their com-
patriots· that some other country has a superior system for producing and 
organizing technical workers. Nineteenth-century Americans admired Ger-
man technical education and the French Ecole Polytechnique (Calvert, 1967), 
whereas late 19th-century Germans emUlated the practicality of British and 
American engineering (Gispen, 1989). More recently, critical observers of 
British engineering have advocated the adoption of elements of German or 
American practice (Lawrence, 1992), whereas American critics look to Japan 
for ways to recapture the technological lead (Kinmoth, 1986). After a quick 
survey of this literature, one comes away with the impression that there is a 
limitless variety of ways of organizing technical workers. 
Perhaps the most remarkable feature of this debate about the organization 
of technical work is the absence of any serious suggestion that engineers 
should be organized as a "profession." Although there is a general sense that 
engineers are "professionals," and not just "employees" or "workers," there 
appears to be an equally general recognition that organizing engineers on a 
professional basis is not very likely to succeed. No matter which theory of 
professionalism one considers, engineers are regarded as examples, at best, 
of incomplete or imperfect professionalization. 
Thus traditional "trait" theorists generally treat engineers as a special case 
because they lack some of the defining traits of a true profession-for 
example, unified professional organizations and a sense of community 
(Perrucci & Gerstl, 1969). More recently, sociologists arguing for a conflict 
or Marxist approach to the professions have seen engineers as examples of 
failed or imperfect professionalization because of their relative lack of 
autonomy and their employee status within organizations (Larson, 1977). 
Even the recent, revisionist "neo-Weberian" approach to the professions 
implies a similar conclusion. If, as these writers have argued, professionalism 
is the attempt to achieve "closure," or exclusive "jurisdiction" over an area 
of knowledge, it is clear that engineers, who lack such mechanisms as 
mandatory licensing and do not restrict professional practice to the holders 
of specific formal credentials, are at best a borderline case of a profession 
(Abbott, 1988; Halliday, 1983). Because professionalization does not work 
for engineers, analysts are left groping for answers to the question of how 
this "special" group of employees should be organized. 
In this article, we argue that there is an important lesson to be learned from 
the debate about how to organize technical workers. Drawing on material 
that will appear in a forthcoming volume (Smith & Meiksins, in press), we 
compare the organization of technical work in six industrialized countries: 
the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Sweden, and Japan. Our 
central observation is that the apparent diversity in the organization of 
technical labor is real; we identify four major models of organizing technical 
labor that are combined in different ways in these six countries. However, 
we argue that there is a common element lying beneath the diversity of 
organizational forms. Technical workers, as occupants of the middle levels 
of organizational hierarchies, seem to represent a kind of intermediate 
stratum within the organization (hence the tendency to see them as employ-
ees, professionals, middle class, etc.). But, their apparent intermediate posi-
tion is nowhere expressed in the creation of a distinct occupational commu-
nity that unifies technical workers. This is a consequence ofthe fact that built 
into the structural position and role of qualified technical labor is a common 
set of tensions that cuts across national boundaries and links together the 
experience of engineers in all six countries. These tensions are not something 
that can be organized away; they consistently impede the organization of 
technical workers as an intermediate social group. They also tend to under-
mine the various forms oforganization that have been adopted as alternatives. 
It is thus our conclusion that there is no stable, "best" way of organizing 
technical workers. 
THE ROLE OF THE ENGINEER 
Before turning to a comparison of the organization of engineering labor 
in the six countries under review, a few preliminary remarks about the role 
and social position of the engineer are necessary. As we have already re-
marked above, engineers have long been seen as unusual among the profes-
sions because most engineering practitioners are employees oflarge organi-
zations. As employees, engineers are subject to various bureaucratic controls 
that may be in tension with norms ofprofessional autonomy and make itmore 
difficult to maintain truly "professional" conditions of work. We agree that 
this is an important feature of the engineering occupation. However, it is only 
part of the story. A full understanding of the nature of engineering requires 
that we recognize that engineers are not simply employees of organizations, 
but that they are employees of industrial organizations. That is, they are an 
important, intermediate group ofhighly qualified employees located between 
management and shop floor workers in productive industry. 
The conditions of modem industry make necessary the employment of a 
large number of such intermediate workers. As industry has grown larger, 
more complex, and more technically sophisticated, it has become necessary 
for firms to employ a complex, diverse group of technical workers who are 
engaged in the labor of designing industrial processes and products and/or in 
overseeing and coordinating the functioning of the workers and equipment 
used in production. What this reflects is the dependence of management on 
a "class" ofqualified technical workers; managers cannot any longer perform 
this labor themselves or rely on relatively untrained workers to design 
products and production systems. 1 
The relationship of this intermediate stratum of technical workers to both 
employers and manual labor is complex. On the one hand, engineers are of 
great importance to employers-they must rely on this kind of qualified 
employee if their firms are to be profitable. Yet, as employees, engineers pose 
something of a problem of control for employers; how can they ensure that 
their technical employees perform their tasks satisfactorily? On the other 
hand, engineers function as a kind of directing authority within the work-
place. Although they may not be in direct contact with production workers, 
their designs, specifications, instructions, and processes are imposed on 
workers from above and are experienced as coercion. Thus there is an element 
of tension built into their relationship with other kinds ofemployees as well. 
A comparative study of technical workers reveals a number of persistent 
problems generated by their ambiguous, intermediate role. First, industry is 
dependent on qualified technical labor; therefore, a method ofproducing and 
recruiting large numbers of such workers must be found. Second, a division 
of labor must be created to perform this necessary technical work. Finally, 
the relationship of various kinds of "intermediate" technical workers to the 
other classes within the enterprise must be defined. No best solution has been 
found to these intractable problems. On the contrary, the history of technical 
workers is the history ofongoing struggles between employers and a diverse, 
divided stratum of technical workers, often involving the state and other 
social groups as well, over how to resolve these dilemmas. 
FOUR MODELS FOR  
ORGANIZING TECHNICAL WORK  
Our analysis of the six countries covered in our survey reveals four major 
approaches to the organization of technical workers. Each of these models 
represents a different strategy for producing a technical work force and for 
defining the social position of technical workers. Of course, these four mod-
els are abstractions; no country perfectly exemplifies a single system. Indeed, 
in many cases, a country's manner of organizing technical work combines 
elements of several of these systems. Nevertheless, these abstractions help 
us to identify what is truly distinctive in each country's experience. 
CRAFf ORGANIZATION 
In this model, the vast majority oftechnical work is defined and organized 
as if it were the top of the hierarchy of manual labor. Technical workers are 
produced and organized in ways that resemble traditional craft methods. The 
central feature of this method of organizing technical work is the reliance on 
the acquisition of technical skills within the fmn or "craft community" 
through methods of apprenticeship and pupilage. Coupled with this is a 
distinct hostility to formal, abstract educational credentials as a route into 
technical work. The engineer is constituted not by the possession of creden-
tials, but by the laborious acquisition of practical experience. There is no 
sharp class wall, buttressed by credentials, between the engineer, the techni-
cian, and the skilled manual worker. 
This form of technical organization produces an occupational community 
that is both homogeneous and highly fragmented. On the one hand, there are 
no formal credentials to serve as the basis for stratification within technical 
work; thus all engineers are, in a basic sense, alike. On the other hand, 
however, engineers' skills tend to be narrow, specialized and fmn specific. 
Having learned their "trade" in a particular workplace, and lacking formal 
credentials, which would tend to make their expertise more "portable," 
engineers of this type are tied to individual fmns and their internal labor 
markets. 
It is also significant that this form of technical organization implies a 
relatively low status for the engineer: Technical workers are produced in the 
same manner as craft workers and are seen as a kind of manual labor. En-
gineers' practical experience on the shop floor blurs the distinction between 
expert and worker. And the rejection of credentialism, coupled with the 
emphasis on experience, makes it possible for manual workers to move up 
into engineering positions. One result is a fairly distinct division between 
engineers and management, as the manual skills of engineers are not seen as 
providing appropriate background for managerial careers. Yet it is also true 
that this system of technical work tends to produce a sense of superiority and 
exclusivity among engineers. As craft workers, they see themselves at the 
top of the productive labor force, as an elite within the hierarchy of skill and 
crafts. Although they may be regarded as part ofmanual labor, they are hostile 
and superior to manual workers with lesser (or no) skills. Thus, looked down 
on by management, yet feeling superior to most of the work force, engineers 
of this type are predisposed toward craft unionism, a form of occupational 
organization that suits their sense of being an elite community of skilled 
workers within the larger mass of blue-collar workers. 
MANAGEruALORGAMZATION 
The managerial model of technical organization defines a substantial 
portion of technical work as part of management. As in the craft model, the 
enterprise is seen as divided into labor and management. However, in this 
case, with the exception of the routine functions carried out by relatively 
poorly trained technicians, most technical work is seen as managerial work 
to be carried out by a distinct type of managerial specialist, the engineer. 
For the most part, the production of engineers takes place within formal 
educational institutions (especially as access to management positions comes 
to require university training). Engineering is cast as expertise, rather than as 
manual skill, which must be acquired through formal training, generally in a 
university context. In this respect, the managerial model mimics purely 
professional forms of organization. However, it would be incorrect to label 
this a professional system for organizing technical work. Despite the empha-
sis on credentialing, there is no requirement that practitioners possess formal 
degrees, nor is there mandatory licensing of those who call themselves 
engineers. Indeed, such occupational closure is explicitly rejected, so that the 
term engineer may be applied to someone who lacks formal university 
training, to someone with a first degree, or to someone who has completed 
the highest level of university education. Engineering, thus, is expertise, but 
it is not to be monopolized by the possessors of specific credentials. 
The status of the engineer within this system is markedly higher than it is 
within the craft form of organization. As possessors of university training, 
engineers are part of society's elite; their expertise qualifies them for respon-
sible managerial careers and the distinction between them and manual labor 
is sharply drawn. This kind of engineer is much more likely to see her or his 
role as placing her or him on the management side of the divide; to see manual 
workers as subordinates, not cooperators, .as a problem that needs to be 
"controlled." As a result, unionization is seen as inappropriate for engineers. 
In contrast, relatively weak professional associations are compatible with this 
model, although stronger ones that seek effective closure and autonomy from 
management produce tension with the model's insistence that engineers are 
part of management. To the extent that engineers do enjoy access to mana-
gerial careers, this tends to tie them to the fmn and its internal labor market, 
thus weakening the appeal of strong professional associations. 
ESTATE ORGANIZATION 
Whereas the frrst two models are based on a dichotomous form of orga-
nization, with the bulk of technical workers all allocated either to manage-
ment or to labor, what we are calling the estate system of organization is 
characterized by the creation of an explicitly stratified hierarchy of technical 
occupations in the middle levels of the fmn. This model is shaped by the 
effort of high-level, credentialed technical workers to consolidate their hold 
on a professional jurisdiction in the context of the industrial capitalist 
enterprise. 
As in the managerial model, formal school-based training is considered a 
legitimate means of producing engineers. However, in this model, the pos-
sessors of engineering credentials are more successful in pursuing a profes-
sional project. That is, they seek to restrict access to engineering positions to 
those technical workers who possess credentials. They emphasize raising 
standards in engineering schools and they try to restrict numbers to maintain 
engineers' standard of living. The result is the creation of a stratum of 
credentialed, highly trained engineers who identify strongly with their pro-
fession and are distinguished thereby from both labor and management. 
This successful professional project tends to limit the supply of technical 
labor. Employers, however, demand a far larger supply; however, status-
conscious, professional engineers do not always fit well into the many 
modest, practical technical jobs employers need to fill. The result is substan-
tial pressure to create other sources of technical labor-this may take the 
form of programs offering alternative, lesser credentials or of producing 
some skilled technical workers through craftlike methods. Thus, although the 
elite professional engineers succeed, up to a point, in their professional 
project, they are obliged to coexist with a variety of other technical workers 
with varying claims to the title engineer. 
What emerges is a hierarchy of technical labor stratified by credentials 
and mode ofentry into the technical work force. Whatever the mode ofentry, 
however, there is a direct correspondence between the type of qualification 
possessed and the engineer's position in the division of the labor within the 
firm. Those with lesser qualifications are excluded from higher technical 
positions, whereas those with higher qualifications start off higher up the 
technical ladder. The hierarchy of technical labor within the firm is, in some 
cases, strengthened and coordinated by the state, which defines the various 
categories of technical worker and may accord special legal privileges to 
some of them. In sum, the distinctive characteristic of the estate model is the 
development of an explicit, readily recognized, nondichotomous hierarchy 
of technical labor. 
Because there are different kinds of technical labor within this model, 
technical workers constitute a more fragmented occupational community 
than in other models. Different kinds of technical workers occupy a different 
social place and see themselves as distinct. Members of the technical elite, 
who generally possess the highest formal educational credentials, have 
relatively high status and access to higher positions. The distinction between 
them and subordinate technical and blue-collar workers is clear, and they 
tend to develop exclusive professional associations restricted to engineers 
who possess the appropriate qualifications and status. Indeed, it could be said 
that this group represents the closest approximation of a successful profes-
sional project in any of the models under discussion (in that, in the abstract 
at least, they approach a successful form of occupational closure through 
credentialing). As one moves down the technical ladder through those 
technical workers with more modest educational levels toward those who 
have been trained within industry itself, this sense of elitism and profession-
alism diminishes, although there is still a tendency to define them as different 
than production workers. These technical workers develop a variety offorms 
oforganization; however; all are more "workerlike'' and "unionlike" than the 
professional associations of the elite and some are willing to create or join 
white-collar or craft unions. 
CORPORATmTORG~ZATION 
The corporatist model oforganizing technical workers is distinguished by 
its efforts to foster a sense of solidarity with the enterprise as a whole, and 
with all of the groups that compose it, rather than a sense of occupational 
sectionalism and class division. Although the familiar hierarchy of occupa-
tions in industry persists, this model is designed to play down, as much as 
possible, the significance of occupational differences. Even the distinction 
between management and labor is deemphasized, in stark contrast to mana-
gerial organization, where this distinction is central. 
The system of recruitment and training is primarily degree based with 
engineers trained in universities. In this respect, the corporatist system 
resembles the managerial and estate models. However, this does not produce 
rigid strata within the enterprise, with professional workers setting them-
selves apart from those with lesser credentials. In part, this reflects the 
character of the educational training, which is too broad to encourage a sense 
of occupational solidarity or to produce real functional specialization. It is 
also rooted in the nature of the labor market. New hires with this relatively 
broad training are recruited directly into the enterprise from the university 
and then trained and promoted from within. There is relatively little lateral 
mobility between firms by technical personnel. 
Within the firm, technical workers are not sharply . distinguished from 
managers or production workers. Engineers are routinely given experience 
in production jobs early on in their careers and a high percentage ofengineers 
are concentrated in production functions (rather than research and develop-
ment) where they have direct contact with manual. workers. At the same time, 
there is no "glass ceiling" for technical workers. On the contrary, the internal 
labor markets within firms are constructed so that many engineers can look 
forward to promotion into managerial positions. 
As might be expected, this form of technical organization is not charac-
terized by the development of strong, occupationally based organizations. 
Instead, because engineers are encouraged to identify with the firm and with 
all of the employees within it, this system is most compatible with fmn-
specific organizations that group together a wide variety of occupations. 
DISCUSSION 
Ifwe turn from the abstract models sketched out in the preceding pages 
to a consideration of actual historical cases, we find that none of the models 
exists in pure form in reality. However, when we apply these models to an 
analysis of actual societies, we learn a great deal about the central tendencies 
of their systems for organizing technical workers. 
Great Britain has been most strongly influenced by the craft model. Inpart 
because Britain was the frrst case of industrialization and faced no real 
industrial competitor, the British state played a relatively small role in the 
industrialization process. In particular, there was little of the kind of con-
scious effort to build up technical education as a way of "catching up" with 
more advanced competitors that was typical of later industrializers (Ahlstrom, 
1982). The state's limited role was also the result of the British industrial 
class's "liberal" hostility to government, which was viewed as aristocratic 
and backward. This, combined with the fact that the industrial sector was 
dominated by small, entrepreneurial fmns, encouraged the production of 
technical workers outside of formal educational institutions through a craft-
like apprenticeship system. Hand in hand with this, technical workers have 
historically had a relatively low status in Great Britain; technical work was 
seen as a kind of extension of manual labor and, thus, not something best 
taught within the universities or something to which members of the upper 
classes should aspire. In contrast to their equivalents in most other industrial 
capitalist societies, British engineers have had limited access to managerial 
careers (Whalley, 1986). From the outset, they were not seen as part of 
management;· if anything, they were pushed closer to the labor movement 
than in most industrialized societies (Buchanan, 1986; Lawrence, 1992; 
Meiksins & Smith, 1992). 
As industry has become more technically complex, the craft model has 
become increasingly antiquated. Although business hostility to the state and 
to the suspect universities slowed the transition, there is no doubt that, by the 
1960s, engineers were more and more likely to be trained in rapidly expand-
ing university programs and the old system of apprenticeship had begun to 
atrophy. Nevertheless, their low status and a tendency toward union organi-
zation has persisted. British engineers continue to opt for union rather than 
professional or other types of organization. Indeed, professional organiza-
tions may have weakened in recent years, as their traditional function as a 
gatekeeper for apprenticeships atrophied. In the most recent period, more-
over, British engineers have shifted toward more comprehensive general 
unions (rather than craft unions), although it should be added that this has 
not eliminated a sense of elitism and of difference among technical workers. 
The legacy of the craft system oforganizing technical work, with its tendency 
to treat engineers as manual labor, has been this preference for unions and a 
social position for technical workers closer to labor than to management 
(Meiksins & Smith, 1992; Smith, 1987). 
The case of the United States, by contrast, exemplifies many of the fea-
tures of the managerial model. Although there was an early struggle between 
craftlike "shop" methods and school methods for producing engineers 
(Calvert, 1967), this was quickly resolved in favor of university training for 
most engineers. With the dramatic growth of giant, science-based corpora-
tions in the late 19th century, business demand for engineering labor ex-
panded rapidly. At the same time, American industrialists, although also 
"liberal" when it came to state intervention, had little to fear from legislation 
such as the Morrill Act, which underwrote the creation of university engi-
neering programs across the United States. On the contrary, perhaps more 
than in any other country, business proved able to shape legislation governing 
engineering education and to exert direct influence over the content and 
character of university engineering programs. Since the late 19th century, 
most American engineers have been trained in university-based engineering 
schools that, in addition to more technical training, have emphasized social-
izing engineering students into their future role as part of management 
(Noble, 1977). This managerial definition of technical work has been but-
tressed by engineers' career structures, which include relatively good access 
to management positions (Zussman, 1985). Despite the suggestion that the 
professionalization of management may reduce this traditional mobility 
pattern, engineer-managers (often with MBAs) continue to be a common 
feature ofAmerican industrial corporations (see Markusen & Yudken, 1992; 
Zussman, 1985).2 
American engineers have generally organized themselves into profes-
sional associations; but these associations are, in fact, quite different from 
their counterparts in a "true" profession such as medicine. Most important, 
these organizations·have never restricted membership to the holders of spe-
cific university credentials and have traditionally opposed efforts at manda-
tory licensing for engineers. There have been attempts to create something 
like classical professional forms for engineers and to use these forms to 
develop an explicit distinction between the engineer and management. 3 
However, these have invariably failed, in part because of the presence within 
engineering organizations of engineer-businessmen who opposed such at-
tempts (fearing that they might exclude managers and would raise the cost 
of engineering labor). Although the effort to equate engineers with manage-
ment has never been completely successful, and the tension between high-
level engineer-managers and rank-and-file engineers has flared up on a 
regular basis, it has been strong enough to block the development of truly 
professional forms of organization (Layton, 1986; Meiksins, 1988). 
The weakness of professional organization in the United States has left 
the door open for occasional experiments with unionization, or at least union-
like organization. This has been particularly true in hard times, when rank-
and-file engineers grew discouraged by the inactivity and lack of indepen-
dence characteristic of their professional representatives. These efforts have 
been significantly less successful than those in Great Britain, reflecting a 
number of factors, including the higher status (as part of management) of 
American engineers. It is also significant, indeed ironic, that engineer-
businessmen, who have often led the effort to block professional organization 
among engineers, have deployed the rhetoric of professionalism in their 
efforts to head off engineering unionism-engineering leaders have always 
contended that such unions were unprofessional (Meiksins & Smith, 1992). 
Germany exhibits many of the features of what we have called the estate 
model of technical organization. However, a closer examination reveals that 
the estate system is combined with, and may be giving way to, a system much 
more like the managerial model. The German system has been profoundly 
influenced by the fact that Germany was a late industrializer (Ahlstrom, 
1982). Faced with the reality of catching up with Great Britain, the German 
state became actively involved in encouraging industrialization, in part 
through the creation of a network of formal institutions of technical educa-
tion. The result was the early triumph of a school-based system for training 
engineers. This development took place, however, in a society still deeply 
influenced by a status system inherited from the preindustrial order. Conse-
quently, engineering leaders sought to raise the status of engineers (which 
was lower than that of university graduates) by emulating the behavior of 
classically educated, theoretically inclined civil servants and professionals. 
Early engineering education, thus, emphasized abstract scientific principles 
and the production of cultivated men (Gispen, 1989; Jarausch, 1990). 
As German industry emerged and grew, and as industrialists gained in 
strength and confidence, the emphasis on science and abstraction in German 
technical education was called into question. Industrialists complained that 
engineers were in short supply and that those whom they could find lacked 
practical skills appropriate to industry. The result was the creation, by the 
early 20th century, of a second tier of technical schools, below the original 
Technische Hochschulen, which soon began turning out large numbers of 
more practically trained engineers (Gispen, 1989). 
On the surface, at least, this created a hierarchy of technical labor in Ger-
many. At the top were the graduates of the Technische Hochschulen, below 
them were the graduates of the ·lesser technical schools, and below them 
technical workers without formal credentials. To an extent, at least, a higher 
credential increased one's chances of achieving a higher position in the 
industrial hierarchy. In practice, however, this estate system has always been 
imperfect. Employers historically resisted attempts to restrict high positions 
and the title engineer to the graduates of the Technische Hochschulen. 
Tensions between the various kiitds of graduates have often run high, es-
pecially when bad times created resentment ofthe elite's privileged economic 
and social position. And, in recent years, partly as a result ofexternal pressure 
from the European Economic Community (EEC), the two types of graduate 
have tended to blur together (although the different degrees remain and 
mobility chances are not identical) (Gispen, in press; Hutton & Lawrence, 
1981; Lawrence, 1992). 
Attempts at creating a true professional association, limited to those with 
specific credentials, failed in the early 20th century and had virtually disap-
peared by the 1930s. The most lasting organization of German engineers is 
the Verein Deutscher Ingenieurs (VDI), which is an American-style engineer-
ing association bringing together engineers of all ranks and qualifications. 
Also, as in the United States, German engineers have experimented with 
unionization, especially in bad times when their weak professional associa-
tions failed them (Gispen, in press). However, it is probably true that the 
tendency toward union organization is stronger in Germany, in part because 
of the greater legitimacy of unionism as a whole.4 This may also reflect the 
more explicit stratification of German engineering. It may encourage those 
with lesser qualifications to see unions as appropriate; in any case, it is more 
difficult for elite engineers to appeal to their minors in the name of an 
allegedly shared set of professional characteristics when the technical work 
forceis more explicitly stratified. 
A similar pattern of engineering stratification developed in Sweden, 
although here the estate system seems to have eroded less. Many engineers 
have only a gymnasium-level education. These engineers are much more 
likely to be in lower-level, routine jobs; indeed, there is evidence that some 
of them are employed in what have traditionally been manual jobs. As a 
result, such engineers have been the backbone ofengineering unionism since 
the 1930s (Amark, 1990); although few of them join the largely manual 
Confederation of Labor Unions (LO) trade union federation, they are most 
likely to be affiliated to white-collar Confederation oflndustrial Employees 
(SIF) unions. Because SIF and LO cooperate on many issues, it is apparent 
that there is not a clear sense of conflict between lower-level engineers and 
production workers in Sweden. Those engineers with university degrees, 
which in Sweden tends to mean a master's-level qualification, typically have 
·higher positions and better access to managerial careers. Like their German 
counterparts, such engineers traditionally gravitated toward professional 
associations, but in the period since World War ll, many have joined a union, 
the Association of Civil Engineers, which is an affiliate of the Confederation 
ofAcademically Educated Employees. This does not mean that the divisions 
within Swedish engineering are disappearing, however, as these unions 
represent a clear rejection of the SIF and LO and, indeed, were established 
and grew largely in resp(>nse to the fear by educated workers that they were 
losing ground as unionized workers made gains (Berner, in press). 
The greater stability of the estate model in Sweden reflects distinctively 
Swedish conditions. Even more than Germany, Sweden industrialized late, 
and the demand for engineers grew very slowly until the World War ll era. 
As a result, there were no German-style shortages of engineers in the late 
19th century (Gispen, 1989) and there was probably less pressure on the 
educational system to expand the production of technical workers for indus-
try. Moreover, the establishment in the 1930s of the Swedish welfare state, 
with its characteristic class compromises, tended to limit the potential for 
conflict over technical work in the postwar period (Berner, in press). In 
particular, the Swedish governmenthas shown a willingness to try to forecast 
the demand for technical (and other professional) labor and to work with 
engineering organizations to try to regulate production accordingly (Amark, 
1990). Given relatively secure employment and salaries for all technical 
workers, elite technical workers did not have to fear the expansion of the 
technical work force. There was little basis for resentment and competition 
between different strata of technical workers. As a result, there was no need 
for an aggressive move toward formal professionalization to limit numbers 
and establish full occupational closure. This, in turn, blunted any desire by 
employers to attack the effective stratification of technical labor, because the 
Swedish version of the estate model did not prevent the expansion of the 
technical labor force when this became necessary. 
The case of France also presents features of the estate model, especially 
the stratification ofthe technical work force by credentials. France developed 
a formal program of technical education early in the 19th century, with the 
creation of the Ecole Polytechnique and, slightly later, the Ecole Centrale. 
Influenced by aristocratic ideals and by the philosophies of Comte and 
Saint-Simon, these schools placed enormous emphasis on abstract principles 
and theory and were intended to train an elite of civil servants and managers 
(Ahlstrom, 1982; Crawford, in press; Weiss, 1982), This left French industry 
without a source ofpractical engineers; faced with the state's lack ofconcern, 
private interests created the Ecole des Arts et Metiers in the 1830s. This 
school had a somewhat tenuous position for much of its early history, only 
winning the right to confer engineering diplomas late in the 19th century. Its 
graduates functioned as engineers and middle managers, but lacked prestige 
because of their association with manufacturing (Day, 1987). Finally, the 
post-World War ll French government, concerned to "modernize" French 
industry, sought to increase the production ofqualified engineers through the 
creation of the so-called petites ecoles, a move that was resisted by many 
engineers, concerned that their credentials would become less valuable 
(Crawford, 1989, in press). Thus a distinct hierarchy of credentials has 
emerged within French engineering. Added to this is the fact that it has 
traditionally been possible to become an engineer in France without a formal 
degree. These so-called ingenieurs autodidactes are often recruited from the 
shop floor or from the ranks of the techniciens superieurs,5 although they 
may have some formal training as well. Their mobility chances are less good 
than those of engineers with credentials, although they are not formally 
excluded from managerial positions (Boltanski, 1987; Crawford, 1989). 
In short, French engineers are stratified by credentials; there is a rough 
correspondence between one's level of credentials and the kind of position 
to which one can aspire (although complete closure does not exist). In this 
sense, the French system of technical organization is very much an estate 
system. However, the organization of technical work in France is made more 
complicated by the existence of the social category of the cadres. This 
category emerged initially in the 1930s when credentialed engineers and 
others, squeezed by the depression and threatened by the polarizing class 
relations of the period, began pressuring the French state into according 
special legal status to middle-class employees who exercised ''responsibility" 
within the fmn (this was granted in the postwar period). Over time, this 
category has become increasingly amorphous, as ingenieurs autodidactes, 
some techniciens superieurs, and others have adopted or been accorded cadre 
status. To some extent, the category provides a kind of unifying middle-class 
identity to the various strata of the engineering work force, and thus coun-
teracts the rigidity and fragmentation of the estate system. However, the 
evidence suggests that its unifying power is not that great, and that the 
divisions and tensions within the cadre category have become greater rather 
than weaker over time (Boltanski, 1987; Crawford, 1989). The salience of 
the stratified organization of the technical work force is demonstrated by the 
fact that unionization decreases as one rises through the various levels of the 
technical hierarchy (Crawford, 1989). 
Finally, Japan is most influenced by the dynamics of the corporatist model 
of technical work. Japanese engineers are trained in universities that, to an 
extent, tend to create a series of education classes. However, the general 
character of the education tends to diminish the significance of educational 
credentials (McCormick, in press). Moreover, several distinctive features of 
the Japanese{l<>litical economy have helped to create institutional forms that 
are designed'~ break down class barriers in the workplace. 
First, as a "late industrializer," Japan borrowed much of its technology 
from more advanced economies. As Alice Amsden (1989) has pointed out in 
her analysis ofthe newly industrialized countries ofSoutheast Asia, this tends 
to focus attention on the shop floor, on making the borrowed technology 
work. Under these circumstances, engineers need to be in close touch with 
shop floor workers. In Japan, engineers are given direct experience in 
production jobs and are highly concentrated in production-related jobs. The 
direct contact with manual.labor seems to discourage the development of 
elitist sentiments among engineers, 
This might have been expected to create a British-style craft orientation 
among Japanese engineers. However, other features ofJapanese society have 
made this unlikely. The famous doctrine ofpermanent employment provides 
for the eventual promotion of many engineers into management; thus the 
social distance between engineers and management is not great. Japan's 
status as a late industrializer has also played a role, because it has meant a 
state-led industrialization in which large firms tend .to dominate. This, 
combined with the repression of Japanese labor in the aftermath of World 
War II (Moore, 1983) has produced a weak labor movement and the predom-
inance of internal rather than external labor markets. It has also helped to 
promote enterprise unionism, which organizes all classes ofworkers in a firm 
into a single "house" union. Like most Japanese employees, engineers have 
a weak occupational identity; their professional associations are relatively 
unimportant. Instead, they belong to enterprise unions and thus are linked to 
other classes of employees and, most important. to the firm. Joining such a 
union does not imply any antagonism for the employer, as it is normal for an 
engineer to use a stint as a union officer as a kind of "career move." All in 
all, the Japanese system seems designed to tie engineers to the firm and to 
make them see themselves as being on a ladder, close to manual labor but 
with good prospects of moving up (Kinmoth, 1986; McCormick, in press). 
CONCLUSIONS 
Clearly, there are significant differences in the way technical work is 
organized in the major industrial countries. We have attempted to summarize 
some of these differences in our four models. Technical workers in different 
countries are trained in different ways, the technical division of labor is 
structured differently, their relationships with employers and production 
workers are different, and they develop and join different kinds of organiza-
tions. Nor do these differences seem likely to disappear. Despite the decline 
of the craft model, and the continued evolution ofeach of the six cases, there 
remain persistent differences among them. It would be beyond the scope of 
this article to develop a complete analysis of why these differences have 
arisen. We can only point briefly to some of the more important factors that 
have conditioned the organization of technical work. 
First, the timing and nature of industrialization have had a great deal to 
do with shaping the evolution ofthe technical work force. In particular, later 
industrializers, because they had to catch up to existing industrial powers, 
are all characterized by active state involvement in stimulating the develop-
ment of formal technical education (and a corresponding rejection of exclu-
sive reliance on the craft model). The timing and nature of industrialization 
has also had other effects. For example, both Japan and Sweden were able to 
avoid, at least for a while, the most extreme pressures to expand rapidly the 
production of technical workers. Sweden's demand for engineers grew 
slowly, thus reducing the tensions we have seen to be common in stratified 
educational systems. Japan, on !}le other hand, was able to get by with rela-
tively few engineers ~ause of its ability to make use of "borrowed" tech-
nology (McCormick, in press). 
Given the importance of the timing of industrialization, it, should not 
surprise us that preindustrial conditions helped shape the evolution of tech-
nical work. It is now a commonplace that preindustrial conditions in Japan 
helped shape the doctrine of permanent employment· and the corporatist 
character of the Japanese firm (Kumazawa & Yamada, 1989); we have seen 
both of these to be important to· the shaping of the technical work force. 
Preindustrial elites· and social relations· were influential in the other cases 
under review as well. For example, in Germany and France, the continued 
salience of a preindustrial status hierarchy and the strength of preindustrial 
elites helped give the system of technical education its distinctive character, 
imposing this on a reluctant, but weak industrial management. In contrast, 
the stronger British industrial elite rejected formal technical training pre-
cisely because they were suspicious of the anti-industrial bias of the univer-
sity system. Ironically, it seems that the allegedly modern German system of 
technical education owes more to preindustrial influences than does the 
allegedly backward British one (see Anderson, 1964; Meiksins Wood, 1992). 
We could add to this list factors such as the strength of the industrial class 
and its ability to "control" the state (clearly of importance in the American 
case); ideological factors such as the social status of technology and the 
prevailing social attitudes to those who worked with it;6 the relative strength 
of unionization in society as a whole, which affected engineers' desire to 
make use of union organization;' and the different ways in which countries 
have sought to emulate perceived "best practices" from abroad.8 No doubt 
there are many other factors we have omitted from this brief discussion. 
What is undeniable, however, is that the organization of technical labor 
has been the product of a complex process of struggle among employers, 
technical workers, the state, manual labor, and preindustrial forces. 9 And, 
despite the different outcomes and the reality that there are complex, histor-
ical reasons for them, there is a recurrent, universal theme in all of these 
processes that cuts across all ofthese national variations. In none ofthe cases 
described here have technical workers as a group developed a distinct occu-
pational community as an intermediate stratum within the enterprise. 
In several of the cases we have examined, technical workers have been 
defined, and have defmed themselves, as part of the two main classes within 
the organization: labor and management. There have been real tensions 
within this definition, as we will note below. Nevertheless, it is certainly the 
case in Great Britain, where technical workers have been allocated to labor, 
and in the United States, where they have been treated as partofmanagement. 
In each ofthese cases, there exists a kind ofcommunity of technical workers, 
but not entirely distinct from the main classes within the organization. 
Japanese technical workers, in contrast, lack strong occupational identity; 
corporatist organization in Japan has effectively discouraged this. In none of 
these cases are engineers constituted as a distinct, intermediate oCcupational 
group. 
To be sure, there have been attempts in some of our cases to achieve 
something like this, through the process of professionalization. But these 
attempts have met with strong resistance (especially from employers),.and 
have generally been defeated or at least significantly weakened. Thus, as we 
have seen, even in those countries most strongly influenced by the estate 
model, nothing like the strong professional associations or effective occupa-
tional closure characterizing the classical professions has emerged. When 
one turns to the Anglo-American world, supposedly the stronghold of engi-
neering professionalism (Child, Fores, Glover, & Lawrence, 1983), its •'fail-
ure" becomes even more apparent. In Britain, the strength of the craft model 
and the low status ofengineers indicate the weakness of professional forms. 
And although the United States makes more use of the rhetoric and forms of 
professionalization, the resistance to closure has been consistent and effec-
tive. If anything, the rhetoric of professionalism has been used as a form of 
social control ofengineers, not as a means for empowering them. 10 Although 
some American engineers have favored the latter, as the early 20th-century 
"revoltofthe engineers" indicated, efforts to achieve this kind ofprofessional 
power have been consistently defeated (Layton, 1986; Meiksins, 1988). 
In short, engineering professionalism has proven to be incompatible with 
all of the versions of industrial capitalism under review. What this reveals is 
the predicament of qualified, educated labor in the industrial capitalist 
enterprise. Contrary to some of the cruder versions of the "deskilling" thesis, 
qualified workers have not disappeared under advanced capitalist conditions. 
On the contrary, the capitalist firm has continued to spawn a wide variety of 
jobs for educated labor. Yet, despite the arguments of revisionist students of 
this type of labor, such workers have been able to sustain little more than a 
shell of professional forms.U 
In many ways, classical professionalism is revealed as a preindustrial 
capitalist vestige. Occupations such as medicine, which were able to carve 
out an arena of practice sheltered from direct control by the capitalist enter-
prise (even if this meant working for organizations such as nonprofit hospi-
tals) were able, for a time at least, to maintain professional forms. But for 
technical workers, whose work placed them in the heart of the capitalist 
enterprise, there is no shelter from capitalist dynamics. Professional aspira-
tions might live on and even achieve a degree of temporary success where, 
as in Germany, precapitalist institutions and classes remained strong. But 
even these "projects" could not be sustained; the needs of industrial employ-
ers proved incompatible with the restrictions imposed by professional orga-
nization.12 If engineers were to succeed in the classic professional project 
(i.e., if they were to develop exclusive claim to a 'jurisdiction," to develop 
control over entry into the profession, to claim effectively the right to police 
themselves, to develop strong, unified professional institutions), employers 
would find themselves in an untenable situation. The professionalization of 
engineering would mean that a class of employees on whom employers 
depend for the day-to-day functioning of the firm, to whom they are obliged 
to delegate a degree of responsibility, would become extremely expensive, 
scarce, and difficult to control. 
Technical workers, thus, find themselves in a peculiar, contradictory 
position. They are "in the middle" of the capitalist firm, between capital and 
labor, and they bear a superficial resemblance (as ostensibly middle-class, 
educated people) to classical professionals such as doctors. Yet, as we have 
seen, their situation is not compatible with real professional organization, 
which would constitute them as a distinct, intermediate stratum. The result 
is that they are constantly torn between the two opposing classes within the 
enterprise, constantly forced to decide whether they are labor or manage-
ment. And whether they persist in seeking to define themselves as an inter-
mediate group, as professionals, or whether they choose to side with (or are 
allocated to) one class or another, the tension built into their intermediate 
position generates persistent instability and conflict. Consider the internal 
contradictions of each of the four models of technical organization we have 
discussed. 
Craft organization, as illustrated by the British case, has encountered 
several basic difficulties. First, it has proven impossible to sustain this system 
of producing technical workers in an era of complex technology. Perhaps 
more important, the consequence of this mode of organizing technical work 
is to treat engineers like workers and to encourage both trade unionism and 
a clear sense of difference from management. Yet, despite their "attraction" 
to the labor movement, technical workers' "superior" role and qualifications 
tend to create tension between them and less qualified employees. 
Managerial-professional organization, as illustrated by the American case, 
also produces distinctive tensions. Because it encourages a sense of elitism 
among engineers, it tends to maximize the degree of conflict between them 
and production workers; engineers seek to control blue-collar workers, 
whereas the latter, with some justice, see the engineer as an integral part of 
the system of corporate authority. Indeed, David Noble (1984) has argued 
that this gap may be growing wider in some branches of American industry 
as new control-oriented computerized machine tool technology eliminates 
the need for personal contact between engineers and machinists. 13 Moreover, 
this model is plagued by internal conflict among engineers. It is difficult to 
sustain the central premise of this model, that is, that all engineers are 
managers. Lower-status engineers are constantly reminded of the differences 
between them and engineer-executives. Even recent efforts to overcome this 
within high-technology companies through an emphasis on corporate culture 
have not succeeded in overcoming professional employees' skepticism about 
the claim that there is no meaningful stratification within the enterprise 
(Kunda, 1992). This becomes the basis for internal conflict, as rank-and-file 
engineers have shown a willingness to organize more effective professional 
bodies and even, occasionally, unions, which might be able to improve their 
material and social status. Engineering employers, realizing that an effective 
professional organization for engineers would make technical work very 
expensive and more difficult to control, have traditionally led the opposition 
to mechanisms for developing professional closure. 
The estate model also has internal contradictions. As we have already 
seen, the technical elite's desire to achieve closure and occupational control 
cypically founders on employers' need to obtain a plentiful supply ofappro-
priately trained, relatively inexpensive technical workers. The only partial 
exception is Sweden, where the welfare state has tempered this kind ofclass 
conflict. Hbwever, even here, the partial rollback of the welfare state in the 
1980s seem:; to be intensifying the latent conflicts among management and 
different str~ta of the work force (Berner, in press). It should be added that 
the estate model has the disadvantage ofdrawing clear lines ofstratification. 
The result is,the absence of a unifying community of technical workers. 
Many of the lower and middling technical workers, freed of ties to elite 
colleagues, find it easy and logical to unionize. In all of the cases influenced 
by estate organization, there have been historical periods, particularly when 
times are tough and economic reorganization is taking place, when the 
various technical strata have become quarreling or even warring groups. 
Estate-profes$ional systems, thus, make apparent the disunity of the class of. 
technical worl:ers and have shown a tendency to foster a kind ofclass conflict 
within engineering. 
The corpotatist form oforganization, as exemplified by Japan, appears to 
be the most stable, harmonious system of all. However, it too has its 
contradiction~. First, it may reflect Japanese backwardness, that is, their 
development:on the basis ofborrowed technology. Having caught up, can the 
Japanese beobme technologically innovative (which would mean more em-
phasis on rejiearch and development engineering) while maintaining their 
emphasis onproduction, their broad educational system, and their low levels 
of speciali~tion? They may have to widen the gap between engineers and 
workers to achieve innovation, or settle in as a second-rate industrial power. 
(Or, at least, if they manage to sustain their "borrowing" by simply buying 
innovations developed elsewhere, it would appear that Japan's model cannot 
be generalized. Someone has to come up with the innovations that the 
Japanese system does not generate.) 
Probabiy most important, can the model be sustained? The Japanese 
economy experienced a well-documented slowdown in the 1970sand 1980s. 
What happens to all ofthose engineers who were promised promotions when 
firms experience slower growth? If the economy requires greater creativity, 
can a firin continue to carry significant quantities of "deadwood" under the 
permanent employment doctrine? There is already evidence of a tendency 
by some Japanese employers to shed some of their less productive, older 
employees. Ifthis becomes more common, as it is likely to do, it will be dif-
ficult to sustain the corporatist principles that have sustained the Japanese 
model (Kumazawa & Yamada, 1989). 
None of these models, then, are able to do away with the dynamic, con-
tradictory position of technical labor. Technical workers are in the middle of 
a hierarchically organized capitalist enterprise, but its dichotomous, polariz-
ing tendencies will not allow them to stake out a middle ground. Technical 
workers are in the middle, but the middle will not hold. 
The lesson ofcomparative analysis of technical labor is that the question 
of how these polarizing tendencies work themselves out, ofwhere the "class 
lines are drawn,'' is to some extent historical, with different outcomes pos-
sible. Technical workers, at times, identify with management, at times with 
labor. More often than not, the class divide seems to run right through the 
technical labor force itself. But what is most important is that none of these 
solutions are stable or correct. Each has a tendency to come undone, as we 
have seen. In a sense, the conflict between labor and capital is being fought 
out through technical workers. It is hardly likely that so dynamic a relation-
ship could be stabilizedby a ••correct" form oforganization. It is also unlikely 
that it would take the same forms in different times and places. 
NOTES 
1. Afull analysis oftheevolution ofthe division oflabor and ofthe related rise oftechnical 
labor is far beyond the scope of this article. For discussions of the processes involved, see 
Braverman (1974) and Can:bedi (1977). An application of some of these authors' ideas to the 
case ofengineers can be found in Meiksins (1982). 
2. Madwsen and Yudken (1992) note that this is particularly true in defence industries, 
which employ a significant percentage of American engineers. 
3. Forexample, a group of"patrician insurgents" sought to persuade engineers to weaken 
their links to corpomtemanagement and toemulate the American Medical Association and other 
classical professional mganizations in the early 1920s. This movement was defeated, in part 
because of managerial resistance from within the engineering community (Meiksins, 1988). 
More recently, during the Vretnam War era controversy, efforts by engineering reformers to 
develop strong codes of ethics and to encourage professional rather than managerial identity 
among engineers did not significantly alter the major professional associations' traditional stance 
(McMahon, 1984; Meiksins, 1992). 
4. SeeMeiksinsand Smith (1992) fora discussion ofthe weaknessofengineeringunionism 
in the United Stares and its relationship to the overall weakness ofthe American labor movement. 
5. Teclrniciens .superiiunare not equivalent to American technicians. They typically have 
2 years offormal training after the bachelor's degree, and often are given supervisory responsi-
bility (Crawford, 1989). 
6. Lawrence (1992) and Ahlstr6m (1982), among others, argue that the high status of 
technology in Germany helped strengthen the position of German engineers. However, see 
Gispen (1989). 
1. See Meiksins and Smith (1992) for an extended discussion of this factor and its effect 
on American and British technical workers. 
8. For a discussion of this kind of emulation, and a general model ofcross-national analysis, 
see Smith and Meiksins (1991). 
9. Burrage, Jarausch, and Siegrist (1990) correctly point out that countries with similar 
economies (e.g., industrialized countries) can have very different forms of professional organi-
zation. Although broad economic forces may affect the development of the professions, the key 
to understanding national variations lies in exploring the interaction among professionals, 
clients, other professions and, above all, the state. Our analysis suggests that this is too narrow 
a focus for an attempt to explain the sources of national diversity in the organization of technical 
work. Our approach involves placing the development of technical labor in the context both of 
the development of industrial capitalism and of a variety of specific historical forces (including 
patterns of class relations, national economic histories and state policy). For a full statement of 
this argument, see Smith and Meiksins (1991). 
10. We have already noted that a rhetorical form of professionalism has been deployed by 
opponents of engineering unionism. See Meiksins and Smith (1992) for a more extended 
discussion. Others have argued that professionalism has been used by employers as a way of 
containing the frustrated career aspirations of engineers who have hit "glass ceilings" in the 
workplace. See Goldner and Ritti (1967). 
11. Andrew Abbott (1988, pp. 150-156) argues that organizational employment for engi-
neers is not incompatible with professionalization. As organizational employees, engineers' 
struggle for jurisdiction becomes centered on the workplace, rather than the public sphere, 
professional associations become less salient, and professionalism becomes more inclusive and 
less focused on rigid boundary demarcation. Torstendahl (1982) contends that, in Sweden, 
professionalism and bureaucratization arose simultaneously. We do not deny that bureaucratic 
employment and professional rhetoric coincided in many cases. However, there is a difference 
between the form and the content ofprofessionalism. It is one thing to call oneself (or be called) 
a professional; it is quite another to translate this into effective occupational closure and control. 
12. Elliott Krause (1991) has argued that professions are, in effect, continuations of "guild" 
controls. Our comments on the precapitalist character of professionalism are consistent 'with his 
view. 
13. Ironically, it may be that this emphasis on engineering as control may be turned against 
the engineering profession. There is some evidence that new computer-aided design (CAD)/ 
computer-aided manufacturing (CAM) technologies may have the effect of controlling some 
kinds of engineering work. A full analysis of the effects ofnew technology on engineers is beyond 
the scope of this article. For a discussion of some of the issues involved, see Smith (1987). 
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